Sahel Crisis: Sovereignty, Coups and the New Power Game in West Africa

Editorial Note

This article was originally drafted in June 2024, at a moment when Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso were already redefining their position within the West African order. Since then, events in Mali have confirmed the importance of this analysis. The coordinated attacks launched in late April 2026 by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) have once again exposed the structural fragility of Mali’s military regime. More importantly, they have highlighted one of the central arguments developed in this article: the Sahelian crisis cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between the state and jihadist groups. It is the product of overlapping insurgencies, separatist ambitions, weak state authority, foreign military involvement and competing narratives of sovereignty.

Reading this text today therefore provides a useful framework for understanding the latest escalation in Mali. The recent attacks do not represent a sudden rupture, but rather the continuation of a deeper trend: armed groups are becoming more coordinated, state control remains limited, and the promise of sovereignty made by the juntas is being tested by the reality of persistent insecurity.

Introduction

On 28 January 2024, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). At first glance, the decision appeared to be another episode in the political instability of the Sahel. In reality, it marked a deeper rupture: the emergence of a new strategic bloc in West Africa, led by military regimes seeking to redefine their regional position, their security partnerships and their relationship with the West.

The three countries share several characteristics. They are landlocked, exposed to jihadist violence, marked by repeated coups, and historically linked to France through colonisation, military cooperation and development aid. Yet in recent years, all three have moved away from France, the European Union, the United States, ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel, while developing closer ties with Russia, China and other non-Western actors. Their creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023 was therefore not only a military pact. It was also a political message: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso intend to present themselves as sovereign states resisting external pressure.

This article argues that the Sahelian breakaway is driven by three interconnected dynamics: the crisis of state authority, the failure of existing security frameworks, and the search for new international partners. Behind the language of dignity and sovereignty lies a more complex reality: these regimes are attempting to transform domestic fragility into political legitimacy, and diplomatic isolation into strategic realignment.

1. A Political Crisis Rooted in State Fragility

The current trajectory of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso cannot be understood without looking at their post-independence political histories. Since 1960, all three countries have experienced cycles of military rule, fragile democratic transitions, weak state institutions and persistent security crises.

Mali’s political evolution illustrates this pattern clearly. After independence, the country moved from a socialist one-party regime under Modibo Keïta to military rule after the 1968 coup led by Moussa Traoré. The democratic transition of the early 1990s created a period of relative pluralism, but corruption, weak governance and insecurity remained unresolved. From 2012 onward, jihadist insurgencies and separatist movements in the north severely undermined state authority. The 2020 coup led by Colonel Assimi Goïta was therefore not an isolated event, but the result of a long accumulation of institutional weaknesses and public frustration.

Niger followed a similar path. Despite the democratic progress represented by the peaceful transfer of power from Mahamadou Issoufou to Mohamed Bazoum in 2021, the country remained exposed to jihadist violence, governance problems and military pressure. The 2023 coup led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani revealed the fragility of Niger’s democratic institutions and the continuing influence of the security apparatus in political life.

Burkina Faso also experienced repeated political ruptures. The legacy of Thomas Sankara remains central to the country’s political imagination, particularly because of his emphasis on self-reliance, anti-corruption and anti-imperialism. After Blaise Compaoré’s long rule and his fall in 2014, the return to constitutional order did not prevent the expansion of jihadist violence. Two coups in 2022 eventually brought Captain Ibrahim Traoré to power, accompanied by a strong sovereignist and anti-French discourse.

These trajectories show a common problem: democratic institutions failed to deliver security, legitimacy and effective governance. As a result, military actors were able to present themselves as the only forces capable of restoring order. In this context, sovereignty became more than a diplomatic principle. It became a political tool used by military regimes to justify their seizure of power and to mobilise public support.

2. The Security Crisis: Jihadism, Separatism and the Weakness of the State

The second factor behind the Sahelian breakaway is the depth of the security crisis. The region is not facing a simple terrorist threat. It is confronted with overlapping conflicts involving jihadist groups, separatist movements, ethnic tensions, local grievances, smuggling networks and competition for territory.

The collapse of Libya in 2011 played a major role in destabilising the Sahel. Weapons, fighters and armed networks circulated southward, especially into Mali. Tuareg fighters who had served in Libya returned to the region, contributing to the revival of separatist mobilisation in northern Mali. In 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad declared the independence of Azawad, claiming a vast territory in northern Mali and triggering one of the most serious crises in the country’s modern history.

However, reducing the conflict to Tuareg separatism would be misleading. Jihadist groups also expanded rapidly, including organisations linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In some cases, separatist and jihadist dynamics overlapped, temporarily converged or competed with one another. This created a highly fragmented conflict environment in which the Malian state, and later Burkina Faso and Niger, struggled to maintain control over peripheral regions.

The geography of the conflict also matters. The so-called “three-border area” between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso became one of the main centres of violence. The state’s limited presence, porous borders and weak administrative control allowed armed groups to move, recruit and operate across national boundaries. This made the traditional state-centric approach to security increasingly ineffective.

The result was a deep legitimacy crisis. Populations saw governments as unable to protect them. Armies suffered repeated losses. Civilian authorities were accused of dependence on foreign forces. In this environment, military coups were not only power grabs; they were presented as corrective responses to national humiliation and insecurity.

3. France’s Military Role and the Limits of External Intervention

France’s intervention in Mali initially appeared successful. Operation Serval, launched in January 2013 at the request of the Malian authorities, stopped the advance of jihadist groups and allowed the recapture of key cities such as Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. In the short term, France prevented the collapse of the Malian state.

Yet the long-term outcome was more problematic. Operation Barkhane, launched in 2014, expanded the French military presence across the Sahel. Its objective was to disrupt jihadist groups and support regional security cooperation. Despite tactical successes, including the elimination of several jihadist leaders, the operation could not resolve the political and social causes of the conflict.

Over time, French military presence became politically costly. Many local actors perceived France as too involved in domestic politics and too close to certain armed groups, particularly in northern Mali. The relationship between Paris and Bamako deteriorated further after the coups of 2020 and 2021, especially when Mali deepened its cooperation with Russia.

The failure of the French strategy was not purely military. It was also political. France helped contain jihadist expansion, but it could not rebuild state legitimacy. Nor could it overcome the growing perception that Western security partnerships had failed to deliver stability. For the juntas, this perception became useful. By expelling French forces, they could present themselves as restoring national dignity and breaking with dependency.

The withdrawal of French troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger did not end the security crisis. On the contrary, jihadist violence continued to spread, especially toward southern regions and border areas. But politically, the departure of French forces allowed the military regimes to consolidate an anti-Western narrative: the problem was no longer only insecurity, but foreign interference.

4. The Alliance of Sahel States: Sovereignty or Isolation?

The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023 marked a turning point. Officially, the alliance was designed as a mutual defence pact between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. It emerged after ECOWAS threatened military intervention against Niger following the 2023 coup. In that context, the alliance served as a deterrent: an attack on one would be considered an attack on all.

But the alliance also has a broader meaning. It represents the political consolidation of a new Sahelian bloc opposed to ECOWAS pressure, Western conditionality and the regional order associated with democratic norms. By withdrawing from ECOWAS in 2024, the three countries deepened this rupture.

This raises an important question: does the Alliance of Sahel States represent a path toward strategic autonomy, or does it risk deepening the isolation of already fragile states?

The answer is not straightforward. On one hand, the alliance allows the three regimes to coordinate politically and militarily, strengthen their bargaining power and resist external pressure. It also speaks to a real sentiment among parts of the population: the desire for sovereignty, dignity and national control over security decisions.

On the other hand, the withdrawal from ECOWAS weakens regional integration, complicates economic relations and may reduce access to diplomatic, financial and institutional support. For landlocked countries already facing poverty, insecurity and limited infrastructure, isolation is a serious risk. The challenge for Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso is therefore to avoid replacing Western dependence with strategic vulnerability to new external actors.

5. Russia: Security Provider and Information Actor

Russia has become the most visible beneficiary of the rupture between the Sahelian juntas and Western powers. Its appeal rests on a simple proposition: military support without democratic conditionality. For regimes under pressure, this offer is attractive.

The Wagner Group, and later Russian-linked security structures, provided the juntas with an alternative to French and Western military cooperation. Russia presents itself as a pragmatic security partner and a defender of sovereignty against Western interference. This narrative resonates strongly in countries where anti-French sentiment has grown.

Russia’s role is not limited to military cooperation. It also includes information influence. Russian state-linked media, digital networks and local partnerships promote narratives that criticise France, celebrate multipolarity and portray Moscow as a reliable ally of African sovereignty. This information strategy is especially effective because it builds on existing frustrations rather than creating them from nothing.

However, Russia’s support also carries risks. Russian military assistance may strengthen regime security, but it does not necessarily address governance failures, economic underdevelopment or the social roots of conflict. There is also a danger that reliance on Russian security support will reinforce authoritarianism while failing to stabilise the countryside.

For the Sahelian juntas, Russia is useful because it provides symbolic and operational value. It helps them show that they are not isolated. But whether Russia can actually help restore long-term stability remains highly uncertain.

6. China: Infrastructure, Resources and Strategic Patience

China’s role in the Sahel is different from Russia’s. Beijing is less focused on direct military involvement and more interested in infrastructure, resources, trade and long-term economic influence.

In Niger, Chinese involvement in oil infrastructure is particularly important. The pipeline linking Niger’s Agadem oil fields to the port of Cotonou in Benin gives a landlocked country greater export capacity and strengthens China’s position as a key economic partner. China is also active in mining and infrastructure projects across the region.

This economic presence gives China political influence, even when Beijing avoids overt political intervention. Unlike Russia, China does not need to dominate the security narrative. Its influence comes from financing, infrastructure delivery and access to resources. For Sahelian governments, China offers investment without the same political conditions often associated with Western partners.

Yet this model also creates dependence. Infrastructure loans, resource concessions and strategic projects can give China significant leverage. For countries seeking sovereignty, the question is therefore not only whether China is a better partner than France or the United States. The real question is whether new partnerships allow genuine autonomy or simply create new forms of dependency.

7. Beyond France, Russia and China: A More Multipolar Sahel

The Sahelian realignment should not be reduced to a binary opposition between the West and Russia. Other actors are also gaining importance.

Turkey has expanded its diplomatic, economic and military presence across Africa since the mid-2000s. Its approach combines embassies, infrastructure projects, defence cooperation, trade and private-sector expansion. In the Sahel, Turkey benefits from its image as a non-Western but pragmatic partner.

The United Arab Emirates also plays a major economic role, particularly as a destination for exports from Mali and Niger. Gulf actors are increasingly important in African trade, gold flows, logistics and investment networks. Their influence is often less visible than that of Russia or China, but it is strategically significant.

This shows that the Sahel is becoming part of a broader multipolar competition. The decline of French influence does not mean the absence of foreign influence. It means the diversification of external actors competing for access, legitimacy, resources and strategic position.

Conclusion: A New Sahelian Order?

The decision by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to distance themselves from ECOWAS, France and Western security frameworks is not simply a diplomatic rupture. It reflects a deeper transformation of West Africa’s strategic order.

These three countries are attempting to convert insecurity into political legitimacy, coups into sovereign revolutions, and diplomatic isolation into multipolar realignment. Their leaders present themselves as defenders of dignity and independence, but their ability to deliver stability remains uncertain.

The central paradox is clear. The juntas reject external dependence, yet they increasingly rely on new external partners. They criticise Western interference, yet Russian security involvement and Chinese economic leverage may create new constraints. They promise sovereignty, yet their states remain weakened by insurgency, poverty, institutional fragility and limited territorial control.

The Sahelian breakaway therefore represents neither a simple liberation from Western influence nor a straightforward descent into isolation. It is a contested attempt to rewrite the rules of regional order under conditions of extreme insecurity.

For West Africa, the consequences are significant. ECOWAS faces one of the deepest crises in its history. France has lost much of its military and political position in the central Sahel. Russia has gained influence as a security partner. China continues to expand its economic footprint. Meanwhile, the populations of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso remain caught between the promise of sovereignty and the reality of persistent violence.

The future of the Sahel will depend on whether these regimes can move beyond symbolic rupture and deliver effective governance. Sovereignty may mobilise crowds, but it cannot by itself secure borders, rebuild institutions or restore trust between state and society. That is the real test of the new Sahelian order.